The average conditional entropy of the key given the message and its corresponding cryptogram, H(KjM; C), which is refer as a key appearance equivocation, was proposed as a theoretical measure of the strength of the cipher system under a known plaintext attack by Dunham in 1980. In the same work (among other things), lower and upper bounds for H(S jM C ) are found and its asymptotic behavior as a function of cryptogram length L is described for simple substitution ciphers, i.e., when the key space S is the symmetric group acting on a discrete alphabet M.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Shannon, in his seminal paper [2] , showed that the conditional entropies of the key and message given the cryptogram can be used as a theoretical measure of strength of the cipher system when assuming unlimited cryptanalytic computational capabilities. These conditional entropies are called the key and message equivocation, respectively.
In general it is difficult to calculate these equivocations explicitly. For that Shannon established in [2] a general lower bound and introduced a random cipher model which would approximate the behavior of complex practical ciphers. Afterward, Hellman [3] reviewed and extended Shannon's information-theoretic approach and showed that random cipher model is conservative in that a randomly chosen cipher is essentially the worst possible. Later on Blom [5] obtained exponentially tight bounds on the key equivocation for simple substitution ciphers. In [1] to derive bounds for simple substitution ciphers on the message equivocation in terms of the key equivocation, Dunham derived such bounds for so-called key appearance equivocation. This author pointed out also, that it can be considered as a theoretical measure of the strength of the cipher system under known plaintext attack. Another contribution of this subject is the Sgarro's work [7] .
In this paper we consider a situation where the key space is confined to a subgroup K of the group S M of all permutations acting on a discrete alphabet M. Apart from simple substitution ciphers, some other classical cipher systems (e.g., transposition cipher with fixed period, matrix system from [2, Example 4.6, p. 667], etc.) can be studied in this model. Other examples are given in [4] and [6] . The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the assumptions and background of substitution ciphers and key appearance equivocation. In Section III, we state a theorem which gives the bounds on the key appearance equivocation for substitution ciphers. In Section IV, four applications of the stated theorem are discussed. The paper ends with some conclusions.
II. ASSUMPTIONS AND BACKGROUND
For basic definitions and notions we refer to [2] , [1] , [9] , and [10] . Let a memoryless message source with a discrete finite alphabet M = f1; 2; . . . ; Ng be given. The probability of a symbol n is denoted by P M (n). The key and message sources are assumed to be independent, and the keys to be equiprobable. The cryptogram alphabet C is taken to be the same as M, and the key space is K/S M -an arbitrary subgroup of the symmetric group acting on M. For every 2 K the cryptographic transformation T : M L ! M L is determined in the following way: If m L = m 1 m 2 . . . m L is a message of length L, then the cryptogram is c L = T(m L ) def = (m1)(m2). . . (mL).
Here, for reader's convenience, we briefly recall some basic concepts about groups and in particular about the symmetric group S X acting on a finite set X. Let G be a group, H be a subgroup of G and g 2 G. The set gH = fgh=h 2 Hg is called left coset of H generated by g. Any subgroup G of S X is called a group of permutations. Let
x 2 X and G be a group of permutations on X. It is easy to check that the set St(x) = f 2 G=(x) = xg forms a subgroup of G, called stabilizer of x. We shall suppose the reader is familiar with the definitions of cycle as element of SX and length of a given cycle. A cycle of length 2, i.e., a permutation that just swaps two elements of X, is called a transposition. Any permutation can be expressed as a product of transpositions. This representation is not necessarily unique, but the number of transpositions which occur is always of the same parity. Those permutations expressible as a product of an even number of transpositions form a subgroup A X , called the alternating group.
Remark: To avoid misunderstanding, we note that any permutation of the message alphabet (i.e., a bijection from M onto itself) generates a substitution when the cryptogram alphabet is taken to be the same.
For the sake of completeness, we recall the definition of key appearance equivocation [1] : where P (kjm L c L ) is a conditional probability of the key k given the message m L and corresponding cryptogram c L .
III. LOWER AND UPPER BOUNDS FOR THE KEY APPEARANCE EQUIVOCATION
Let K(m L c L ) be the set k 2 K : T k (m L ) = c L and = jK(m L c L )j. Under the imposed assumptions (see the beginning of previous section), it is easy to obtain that P (kjm L c L ) = 1 if k 2 K(m L c L ) and P (kjm L c L ) = 0, otherwise. Therefore, we have H(Kjm L c L ) = log k 2 K : T k (m L ) = c L : (1) We shall make use of the following lemma. Lemma 3.1: Let G be a group of permutations on the finite set X.
If the set G(x; y) = f 2 G=(x) = yg, where x and y are some fixed elements of X, is nonempty, then it is a left coset by the stabilizer St(x). In particular, jG(x; y)j = jSt(x)j.
Proof: Obviously, if 2 G(x; y) then for any 2 St(x) we have (x) = (x) = y. Conversely, if (x) = y and (x) = y then 01 (x) = 01 (y) = x. Hence 01 2 St(x).
So, the cardinality of G(x; y) is either 0 or, by second claim of Lemma 3.1, does not depend on y when the latter is in the orbit of x. This fact is used essentially in the proof of main theorem. Now, we return to notations from the beginning of Section II. In order to state the main theorem we need the following definitions.
Definition 3.2:
The set F () def = fj 2 M=(j) = jg is called a fixed set of 2 K.
For any 2 K, by P , we will denote the sum of probabilities j2F () P M (j).
Let K 3 be the set of all permutations in K excluding the identity e. Definition 3.3: The key 2 K 3 is called maximal if there exists no other 2 K 3 such that F () is proper subset of F ( ).
By Kmax we will denote the set of all maximal keys. For instance, when K SMthe case of simple substitution cipher, it is clear that K max consists of all transpositions. But when K = A M , the maximal keys are the cycles of length 3, since single transpositions do not belong to A M .
The following theorem is a generalization of the result obtained in [1] on the behavior of key appearance equivocation for simple substitution ciphers as a function of cryptogram length. 
IV. APPLICATIONS
We shall consider four applications of Theorem 3.4. For the first two applications we assume without loss of generality that P M (1) P M (2) 111 P M (N).
1) Let K SM-the case of simple substitution cipher. As already mentioned, K max consists of all transpositions. Therefore, R 1 = N02 j=1 PM(j) = 1 0 PM(N) 0 PM(N 0 1), jKj = N! and jK max j = N 2 . This result is obtained in [1] . 2) Let K = AM, where AM is the alternating group acting on M.
Since K max consists of all 3-cycles, proceeding as in the previous case we get: R 2 = N03 j=1 P M (j) = 1 0 P M (N)0P M (N 0 1) 0 P M (N 0 2), jKj = N!=2 and jK max j = 2 N 3 .
3) Let d be a positive integer. We will consider messages of length L = kd, k 1. Since the message source is memoryless it is memoryless also over the cartesian product M d considered as an alphabet. Let 2 S 1 , where 1 = f1; 2; ...;dg. Define a mapping T : M d ! M d as T (m 1 m 2 ...m d ) def = m (1) m (2) ...m (d) . Since is a permutation of 1, it follows that T is a permutation of M d . The set fT = 2 S 1 g with operation usual product of permutations, is a group isomorphic to S1 and a subgroup of S M . This is a description of the so-called transposition cipher with period d.
Furthermore, it is well-known that any 2 S 3 1 can be represented as product of disjoint cycles in a unique manner, up to the order of occurrence of the cycles. A partition of 1 corresponds to this representation and it is not difficult to see that the fixed set F (T) consists of exactly those m d 2 M d whose letters in numbered places belonging to the same subset of the partition of 1, coincide. Therefore, if we take 2 S 3 1 different from such that the partition of 1 determined by is "more detailed", then the inclusion F (T) F (T) holds. The latter shows that those T are maximal for which is a cycle of length 2, i.e., is usual transposition. Taking into account the above considerations it can be easily computed the rate R 3 = N j=1 P 2 M (j), the order of subgroup jKj = d! and the number of the maximal keys jKmaxj = d 2 for this case. Finally, we note that inequalities of Theorem 3.4 now become
For similar result see [8] .
4) Let now, the alphabet F be a finite field with jFj = N . Let K be the group of affine transformations g : y = ax + b; a; b 2 F;a 6 = 0: Obviously, each affine transformation y = ax + b, a 6 = 1 possesses just one fixed point x f = b=(1 0 a) and when b runs through F the same does x f . Moreover translations y = x + b, b 6 = 0 do not possess any fixed points. Thus, we have R 4 = maxfPF(n)=n 2 Fg, jKj=N(N01) and jKmaxj=N(N02).
V. CONCLUSION
Despite that during the past three decades mainly computational aspects of cryptology have been developed, there is still place for information-theoretic investigations. An example in this direction is the theorem from the present paper which justifies mathematically the claim that in a strictly information-theoretic setting, the recovery of the key in a known plaintext attack on substitution ciphers is much difficult when it possesses many fixed points. This is also in accordance with Remark 2 from [1] valid for general type of cipher systems, which points out the existence of trade-off between protecting the key under a known plaintext attack and protecting the message under a ciphertext-only attack when the key size is fixed.
